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The Effect of Variation of Ballot Form on the Vote 
RICHARD J. TruLLINc and MARK ERICKSON 
Duke University 
I. 
Among the numberous factors which influence the outcome of an 
election, one set of factors-variation in ballot form-has been given 
minimal emphasis in election analysis. In this paper we shall present 
additional evidence to suggest that variations in ballot form can influence 
both the decision making of the individual voter and the aggregate 
outcome of an election. 
Variations in ballot form refer to differences in the organization and 
positioning of offices and propositions on ballots used by voters, includ-
ing distinctions between voting machine ballots and paper ballots. That 
such variations can affect electoral behavior has been documented by 
many scholars.1 Among the many propositions which have been put 
forth, we shall examine the following: 
( 1) that the installation of voting machines affects electoral partici-
pation, specifically by reducing turnout for Constitutional 
Amendment races; 2 
(2) that the installation of voting machines can influence the out-
come of Constitutional Amendment races; 3 
1 See for example Henry M. Bain and Donald S. Hecoclc, Ballot Positioning and 
Voter Choice: The Arrangement of Names on the Ballot and Its Effect on the Voter 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse , 
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 
1960) , pp. 266-289; John E. Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Pattern 
and Historical Trends in California ," American Political Science Review, 63 (1969) , 
1297-1312; Jerrold Rusk, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot on Split Ticket Voting 
in 1870-1908," American Political Science Review, 64 ( 1970), 1220-1238; Norman 
C. Thomas, "Voting Machines and Voter Participation in Four Michigan Constitu-
tional Revision Referenda," Western Political Quarterly, 21 (1968), 409-419; Jack 
R. Walker, "Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and 
Party Column Ballots," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 ( 1966), 448-463. 
For a history of the ballot , see Walter Dean Burnham , "The Changing Shape of 
the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review , 59 ( 1965), 
7-28; and Burnham, "Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's 
'Change in the American Electorate,' " American Political Science Review, 68 ( 197 4) , 
1002-1023. 
2 George B. Mathers , A Preliminary Report of an Analysis of the Effects of the 
Use of Voting Machines in Voting on Special Questions in [owQ,--1920-1956 (Iowa 
City: Institute of Public Affairs, University of Iowa, 1964) ; Thomas, op. cit. 
3 Thomas, op. cit. 
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( 3) that position on a ballot can influence the partisan division of 
the vote; 4 and, 
( 4) that the form of the ballot can affect roll-off, or the difference 
in participation between races at the top of the ballot and races 
at the bottom of the ballot. 5 
Our data will come from the results of several elections in Durham 
County, North Carolina, beginning in 1952, when Durham County began 
to install voting machin es, through 1970.6 
II. 
Participation in referenda on constitutional amendments varies 
according to whether voting machines are used or not. George B. Mather 
published a study in which he showed that the use of voting machines 
rather than paper ballots in such elections results in lower participation. 7 
Norman P. Thomas concurs with Mather's findings and suggests that 
the more complex mental and physical actions that are required to cast 
a referendum vote on a voting machine explain this occurrence. 8 His 
study of the voting on referendum questions in Michigan reveals the 
data of Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Participation Levels in Machine and Paper Ballot Precincts in Four 
Referenda Questionsa 
1958 1960 1961 1963 
Machine .... . ..... ............... 61.0% 65.0% 83.0% 94.0% 
Paper ........... ...... .......... 87.0% 87.0% 99.0% 100.0% 
Total ................ . . . . . . . . . 74.0% 76.0% 92.0% 97.0% 
a Source: Norman C. Thomas, "Voting Machines and Voter Participation in 
Four Michigan Constitutional Referenda ," Western Political Quarterly, 21 ( 1968), 
p. 415. 
In 1952, Durham County was in the process of replacing its paper 
ballots with voting machines. Consequently, six precincts-Pearson, 
Lakewood, Fuller , Hillside, Bragtown , and Forest Hills-used voting 
machines while the rest of the precincts still had paper ballots. This 
transition period provides us with a convenient measure of the ballot's 
effect on the outcome of Constitutional Amendment races and more 
specifically, whether participation on Constitutional Amendment con-
tests is higher on paper ballots or voting machines. 
4 Bain and Hecock, op. cit.; Howard White, "Voters Plump for First on the 
List," National Municipal Review , 39 ( 1950 ), 110-111. 
5 Walker, op. cit. 
6 Election results were gathered from the Durham Morning Herald and Durham 
Sun newspapers from 1952 through 1970. 
7 Mather, op. cit. 
s Thomas, op. cit. 
THE EFFECT OF VARIATION OF BALLOT FORM ON THE VOTE 99 
In the six voting machin e precincts, 7,123 people voted in the elec-
tion. Of these voters , 37.2% voted on Amendment I; 35.4% voted on 
Amendm ent II ; and 35.6% voted on Amendment III. The percentage 
of participation in the pap er ballot precincts was much greater, however. 
In the paper ballot precincts , 23,488 people voted in the 1952 election. 
Of the se 23,488 voters, 75.5% voted on Amendment I; 69.4% voted on 
Amendment II ; and 67.5% voted on Amendm ent III. ( See Table 2.) 
TABLE 2. Participation in Constitutional Amendment Races in 1952 
Ame ndme nt 
I 
II 

















The data show, then, that there is a substantial difference between par-
ticipation on these special questions on voting machin es and on pap er 
ballots. 
Several explanations can be offered for the Durham County data. 
Fir st of all, because voting machines were new, many peopl e may have 
been unsure as to how to operate them. Second, the Constitutional 
Amendment questions were not placed centrally on the machine ballot , 
but instead, these special questions were located above the major offices. 
Therefore, many peopl e entering the voting booth may have had the 
major offices in mind and might not have focused on the Amendment 
issues, thus producing the low participation rates. Third, the format of 
the paper ballots was crucial. A separat e ballot was handed out for each 
group of races. Hence, the Constitutional Amendment contests occupied 
their own ballot. This forced people to focus on these questions individ -
ually without being detract ed by the other races. The ballot , in effect , 
increased the visibility and importanc e of the Amendment questions and , 
consequently, made voters more apt to vote in the election. In short , 
particip ation on Constitutional Amendm ent questions was shown to be 
higher on paper ballots as opposed to voting machines. 
Finally , the Board of Elections might have introduc ed voting ma-
chine into precincts in which it anticipated the least resistanc e to their in-
troduction and the least difficulty in their use. If in fact voting machine 
precinct voters were systematically different from nonmachine precinct 
voters with respect to one or more criteria other than the pr esence of 
the machines, then these other differences might account for the differ-
ences we have observed in the voting behavior of machine and p aper 
ballot pr ecincts. Our examination reveals, however, that the six precincts 
that contained the voting machines in 1952 were not distinguished from 
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the other pr ecincts in Durham County with regard to socioeconomic 
status, race, or educational level, so the Board of Elections seems not 
to have chosen these precincts on the basis of one or more of these 
census characteristics. In turn, socioeconomic status, race, and educa-
tional level do not seem to account for the differences in Table 2 be-
tween voting machine precincts and paper ballot precincts. 
III. 
Thomas also feels that machine precincts tend to be more supportive 
of state constitutional revision than paper ballot precincts. 9 This was 
found to be true even when he controlled for partisan tendency, urban-
rural composition, anl census characteristics. ( See Table 3.) 
TABLE 3. Mean Percentage Support for Constitutional Revision in Machine and 
Paper Ballot Precincts" 
1958 
Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0% 
Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.0% 













• Source: Norman C. Thomas, "Voting Machines and Voter Participation in 
Four Michigan Constitutional Referenda, " Western Political Quarterly, 21 (1968) , 
p. 415. 
This observation is also easily testable in Durham County due to 
the ballot transition in 1952. In this year , three Constitutional Amend-
ments were brought up for votes. The first Amendment provided for a 
limitation of tax levies; the second dealt with the procedure of filling 
vacancies in certain legislative offices; and the third concerned the 
filling of vacancies in certain state offices. 
On Amendment I, 2,534 people voted in voting machine precincts; 
69.0% voted in favor of the reform, while 31.0% voted against the Amend-
ment. In the paper ballot precincts, 17,830 people voted; 63.0% voted 
in favor of the reform, whereas 37.0% voted against the Amendment. 
On Amendment II, 2,801 people voted in the machine precincts; 
71.0% voted "yes," for reform, while 29.0% voted "no." In the pap er 
ballot precincts, 16,004 voted and 67.0% supported the revision and 
33.0% did not. 
On Amendment III, 2,346 people voted in the voting machine areas. 
Of these people , 72.0% favored the reform and 28.0% did not. In the 
paper ballot precincts, 16,033 voted, of which 77% voted "yes" and 23.0% 
voted "no." 
9 Jbid., p. 415. 
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TABLE 4. Effects of Voting Machines on Affirmative Responses to Proposed 
Constitutional Amendments 
Amendment I Machine 
For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.0 % 
Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.0% 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0% 
(N) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................... (2534) 
Amendment II 
For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.0 % 
Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.0 % 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0% 
(N) ......................... . ... .. . . ..... (2801) 
Amendment III 
For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.0% 
Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.0 % 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0% 














Thomas' assertions are thus partially correct for the case of Durham 
County in 1952. A slightly higher proportion of participants in the voting 
machine precincts voted in favor of Constitutional revision in two out 
of three races. Voting machine precincts favored the first Amendment 
almost 40 percentage points more than th eir counterparts voting on 
paper ballots. However, the paper ballot precincts regist ered a 5.0% 
higher acceptance of the third Constitutional question than did th e 
voting machine precincts. 
What is clear from these Durham data, however, is that the in-
dividual Constitutional question can affect both participation rates and 
divisions of the vote. In paper ballot precincts , approximately 11.0% 
more people voted for Amendment I ( limitation of tax levies) than for 
either Amendment II ( filling vacanci es of certain legislative offices) or 
Amendment III ( filling the vacancies of certain state offices). Yet the 
number of voters for Amendment I fell between the number of Amend -
ment II and the number for Amendment III, even though th e percent 
opposing I and the number opposing I both surpassed the respective 
figures for the other Amendments . 
Amendment differences are also evident within the group of voting 
machine precincts. Here , however , Amendment II attracted the largest 
number of participants and the largest number of supporters. 
In sum, although voting machine precincts and pap er ballot pre-
cincts seem to differ in the extent of their support for Constitutional 
revision, the natur e of the proposed Constitutional revision can cause 
greater variation in support th an that caused by the machine versus 
paper ballot distinction. 
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IV 
Having discussed the importance of the type of ballot ( voting ma-
chine or paper), we shall now examine the effect of name position on 
the ballot. In general, the studies done on this topic reveal that position-
ing plays little or no part in high visibility elections. The importance 
of position on the ballot emerges, however, in elections that the voters 
are apt to know little about, for example races given little press coverage 
or races for more obscure offices. For instance, in Howard \Vhite's study 
of the 1948 Republican primary for an Ohio Senate seat in which I. E. 
Baker defeated William Tyrell, the data reveal that the candidate 
whose name appears at the top of the ballot will benefit from that 
position. In the 144 voting machine precincts where Baker's name 
appeared first, 7,262 votes were cast of which Baker won 61.5% and 
Tyrell 38.5%. Tyrell's name appeared first in 128 precincts in which a 
total of 6,218 votes were cast. Tyrell won 59.9% of these votes while 
Baker got 40.5%. Thus, 60.0% of the total was cast for the name appear-
ing on the top line. Additionally, out of the 272 voting machine precincts, 
231 ( 84.9%) were carried by the candidate whose name appeared on 
the top line whereas only 33 ( 12.1 % ) were carried by the candidate 
whose name appeared on the second line ( eight precincts were tied) .10 
Similar data were found by Henry M. Bain, Jr. and Donald J. 
Hecock in their studies of elections in several Michigan cities . They 
discerned that position was a significant factor determining voter choice 
in primary and non-primary elections when both paper ballots and vot-
ing machines were used. According to them, the first position on the 
ve1tical list was universally preferred when paper ballots were used. 
However, no position within any one horizontal row was consistently 
favored. 11 
In elections with a long list of candidates, additional positions seem 
to be favored. In a race for a new Junior College's Board of Trustees in 
California, there were 133 candidates of which seven were to be elected. 
The names were listed alphabetically in a vertical line over seven pages 
of a ballot. One would expect that the order effect on a list of tlus length 
would follow a T' curve pattern; that is, while the names at the top 
of the list gain substantially from that position, those at the bottom 
of the list would benefit somewhat as well. According to this theory, 
the worst position to occupy is shortly before the end. Traces of this 
effect were seen in the Junior College election but with a modified 
application. Because the names were listed over seven pages of a ballot, 
10 White, op. cit. 
11 Bain and Hecock, op. cit. 
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the candida tes who appeared first and last on each page did receive 
some 5,000 votes more than one would expect on the basis of other con-
siderations.12 Hence, the "J" curve hypothesis seems to be correct. 
Ballot position is also a crucial factor in determining the amount 
of abstentio n an item garners. A non-controversial proposition which 
can be expected to have a relatively low abstention rate seems to have a 
higher one if it is placed among propo sitions with high expecte d absten-
tion rates. Similarly, rac es which immediately follow intensely fought 
contests seem to have lower abstention rates than normally would be 
expected.13 Our study of a series of Senatorial and Congr essional races 
in Durham County seems to reflect these findings, too. 
During Presidential election years, the senate race has always been 
placed toward the end of the Durham County ballot. How ever, in non-
Presidential election years, the Senatorial contest is given the first or 
second position on the ballot. An examination of the elections for the 
years 1950 to 1968 shows that in every case a higher percent age of 
election participants vote for the senate contest in non-Presidential years. 
In 1950, both Senate seats were up for election-one seat had to 
be filled for an unexpired term. Of the voters who went to the polls, 
94.8% voted in the regular term race and 94.6% voted in the une>..-pired 
term race . In 1954, one of th e seats was up for re-election. Since it was 
a non-Presidential year, the contest was placed second on the ballot 
and 95.4% of the voters that year participat ed in th e Senate election . 
The other seat came up for election in 1956--a Presidential year-and, 
consequently, it was plac ed in the twenty-fifth position on the ballot. 
That year the race received only 77.6% participation. 
In 1960, the Senate race was plac ed in the sixteenth position on 
the ballot. The percentage of participants who voted for that race was 
74.7%. The off-year Senat e seat election in 1962 was placed at the top 
of the ballot and 78.9% of the voters that year expressed a preference 
in the race. Finally, in 1966, with the race located near the top once 
again, 80.3% voted in the contest. Hence, each year that the Senatorial 
race was placed near th e top of tl1e ballot , it received proportionat ely 
fewer abstentions than when it appeared near the bottom. ( See Tabl e 5.) 
This same phenomenon can be observed in the Congression al rac es 
in Durham County as well. Each year that the Senatorial race shifted 
positions, the Congressional race did likewise, while the other races 
remained more or less stationary . 
12 John E. Mueller , "Choosing Among 133 Candidat es," Public Opinion Quar-
terly, 34 (1970), p. 399. 
13 Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions," op. cit., p. 1207. 
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TABLE 5. S.enatorial Race Participation Rates, 1950-1966 
Positi.on of Race on Ballot 
Top Bottom 
1950 1954 1962 1966 1956 1960 
Number of Voters in Senatorial 
Race ......... ..... . . . . 6771° 5018 11436 20961 22814 26899 
Number of Voters in Senatorial 
Race as % of All Voters ... . .. 94.7%0 95.4% 78.9% 80.3% 77.6% 74.7% 
Total Number of Voters . . . . . . . . 7159° 5261 14497 25036 28121 36030 
0 This number represents the average of the two Senatorial races that year. 
In 1960, 1964, and 1968 the Congressional race was located near 
the bottom of the ballot and these races received participation rates of 
77.8%, 76.8% and 83.8%, respectively. However, when this race was 
placed at the front of the ballot, as it was in 1962, 1966, and 1970, the 
participation rates were 90.0%, 97.0%, and 96.4%. In short, abstention 
rates were quite a bit higher when the Congressional contest was given 
a less visible position. ( See Table 6.) 
The difference in abstention and participation rates would seem 
to correspond to known differences between the electorates participating 
in Prsidential election years and those participat:iJ:\g in off-year elections. 
Roll-off occurs in Presidential election years because peripheral voters 
who have entered the electorate to vote for President fail to vote for 
lesser offices. Their low levels of political interest are not sufficient to 
sustain their participation in elections for offices which have generated 
lower levels of political stimuli and publicity. Thus, these peripheral 
voters fail to vote for offices listed toward the bottom of the ballot. In 
off-year elections, these peripheral voters have not been attracted to 
the polls, so that the participating electorate is composed mainly of core 
voters. 14 The core voter, who is able to sustain his own interest in 
politics and elections even in off-year elections, despite the reduced 
levels of political stimuli in off-year elections, might therefore be 
expected to participate in all of the races listed on the ballot. In fact, 
for Senatorial and Congressional elections, the more visible ballot posi-
tion in off-year elections is probably not necessary to stimulate the 
14 The seminal piece on core and peripheral voters is Angus Campbell, "Surge 
and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change ," pp. 40-62 in Angus Campbell, Philip 
E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political 
Order (New York: Wiley, 1966). See also Robert B. Arsenau and Raymond E. 
Wolfinger, "Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections," paper prepared for delivery 
at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Jung 
Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 4-8, 1973; and Samuel Kernell, "Presi-
dential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-
Term Electoral Decline of the President's Party," paper prepared for delivery at the 
1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Palmer House 
Hotel , Chicago, Illinois, August 29-September 2, 1974. 
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TABLE 6. Congressional Race Participation Rates, 1960-1970 
Positwn of Race on Ballot 
Top Bottom 
1962 1966 1970 1960 1964 1968 
Number of Voters in Congressional 
24844 21809 27658 30560 37921 Race .... . . . ................ 13044 
Number of Voters in Congressional 
Race as % of All Voters ...... 90.0% 97.0% 96.4% 77.8% 76.8% 83.8% 
Total umber of Voters ....... . . 14497 25036 22616 36030 39777 45227 
participation of these core voters, whereas the less visible ballot posi-
tion in Presidential election years serves only to make it easier for peri-
pheral voters to leave the electorate and to cause roll-off. We might 
suppose that a more prominent position for Senatorial and Congressiona l 
races on the Presidential-year ballots could increase the participation 
of peripheral voters in these contests. At the same time, a less prominent 
position on the off-year ballots probably would not seriously affect the 
participation rates of the core voters, who make up such a large portion 
of the off-year electorate. 16 
Roll-off reflects not only the presence of peripheral voters in the 
participating electorate but also general "voter fatigue," which can be 
induced by increasing the complexity of the ballot. 16 For instance, roll-
off is more widespread when the Office Block version of the Australian 
Ballot is used rather than the Party Column version, 17 since the Office 
Block requires more effort to complete. Kansas adopted the Office Block 
Ballot in 1913 and roll-off from the race for the Presidency to that for 
the House of Representatives increased sharply. 18 ( See Table 7.) 
Further proof of the roll-off resulting from ba1lot form can be 
found in a comparison of Ohio and Michigan, two states with similar 
TABLE 7. Percent Roll-OH From President to National House of Representatives 
in Kansas, 1896-1 932G 
Election Year 1896 1900 1904 1908 191211920 1924 1928 1932 
Election Year 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1920 1924 1928 1932 
% Roll-Off . . . . . . . 3.0% 3.0% 5.0% 1.0% 4.0% 9.0% 8.0% 10.0% 9.0% 
8 Source: Jack R. Walker , "Ballot Form and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the 
Office Block and Party Colurnn Ballots," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 
( 1966), p. 452. 
16 The findings of Campbell, et al., The American Voter, op. cit., would siniilarly 
suggest that core voters would be more or less impervious to the form of the ballot 
while peripheral voters would be most sensitive to variations in ballot form. As 
they state the proposition (p. 283; emphasis in original): "formal poUtical institu-
tions have their greatest impact on behavior when the attitudes relevant to that 
behavior are least intense." 
16 Walker, op. cit., p. 452. 
17 For a description of the Office Block and Party Column versions of the 
Australian Ballot, see Rusk, op. cit. 
18 Walker, op. cit., p. 452. 
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economic structures, political competition, and social backgrounds of 
their populations. 19 Ohio adopted the Office Block in 1949 and Michigan 
used the Party Columns throughout the same period. ( See Table 8.) 
In comparing the roll-off rates in Ohio and Michigan , we can see 
that the introduction in 1949 of the Office Block Ballot had a major 
impact on the rate of roll-off. When the Office Block was adopted in 
TABLE 8. Comparison of Roll-OH in Michigan and Ohio, 1940-1958a 
Election Percent Roll-Off 
Year Offices Involved Ohio Michigan Difference 
1940 Pres.-State Sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.0% 5.4% 3.6% 
1942 Gov.-State Sec. ......... . ' . . ...... 8.0% 8.0% 0.0% 
1944 Pres .-State Sec. ..... . . . . ... . ...... 7.9% 2.0% 5.9% 
1946 Gov.-State Sec. .... . .... . . . .. . .... 7.5% 5.6% 1.9% 
1948 Pres.-State Sec. ................ . .. 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 
1950 Gov .-State Sec. ................... 8.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
1952 Pres.-State Sec. ........... ' ...... . 10.0% 1.0% 9.0% 
1954 Gov.-State Sec. . ... .. .. ~ .......... 7.0% 2.6% 4.4% 
1956 Pres.-State Sec. ................... 10.3% 3.0% 7.3% 
1958 Gov.-State Sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3% 2.8% 4.8% 
n Source: Jack R. Walker, "Ballot Form and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the 
Office Block and Party Column Ballots ," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 
(1966), p. 454. 
Ohio, roll-off doubled. In the period from 1940 to 1948, the differences 
in roll-off between the two states averaged 2.4%; but in the period 
from 1950 to 1958, the average difference was 5.8%.20 
The positioning of the races on the voting machines in Durham 
County allows us to study the roll-off in several elections as it is caused 
by ballot placement. An examination of the ballots on which the Presi-
dential contest appears reveals that sometimes the Presidential race is 
located on the same line as the rest of the races. This means that by 
pressing one lever, one can vote a straight ticket on all races. However, 
during other years, the Presidential race is given a separate line. One 
has to vote for the Presidential race separately. A look at the roll-off 
rate behveen the Presidential race and the Secretary of State race will 
help us determine whether separating the Presidential contest from the 
rest of the ballot increases roll-off. 
On the voting machine ballots in 1952, the Presidential race was 
located on the same line as the other races. One lever was sufficient 
to vote a straight ticket for all the positions; 98.9% of the voters partici-
19 Ibid. 
2o James K. Pollack, The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan (Ann Arbor: 
Michigan Government Studies No. 6, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 
1940). 
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pated in the Presidential contest and 93.0% participated in the Secre-
tary of State contest. Thus, the roll-off rate was 5.9%. 
In 1956, the Presidential race was placed above the rest. One was 
forced to vote for one's Presidential preference and the rest of one's 
choices separately. With this format, 96.2% of those taking part in the 
election voted in the Presidential race and 79.6% voted for their choice 
for Secretary of State. Roll-off equalled 16.6%. 
The 1960 ballot had the same format as the 1952 ballot. The statistics 
for the year showed 92.6% voting for President, 78.0% voting for Secre-
tary of State, and a roll-off rate of 11.6%. 
In 1964 and 1968, the Presidential and other races were separate. 
In 1964, 95.9% of the voters voted for President and 76.0% voted for 
Secretary of State, with a roll-off of 19.9%. In 1968, 94.4% participated 
in the Presidential contest and 78.4% in the Secretary of State contest, 
making roll-off 16.0%. ( See Table 9.) 
TABLE 9. Roll-OH Between Participation in Presidential and Secretary of State 
Races 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 Mean 
Presidential Race Separate . . . . . . . 16.6% 19.9% 16.0% 17.5% 
Both Races Together . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9% . . 11.6% 8.8% 
The roll-off rate seems to increase substantially when the Presidential 
race is separated from the rest . The mean roll-off rate for the years 
when the race was separate, 17.5%, was twice that for the years when 
the races were combined, 8.8%. 
This evidence suggests the possibility of voting a straight ticket by 
pulling one lever is very inviting for a voter. The more levers one is 
required to use, the less likely is one to participate in the less visible 
races. Hence, the Durham County statistics reaffirm the proposition 
that many voters are enticed into voting a ticket that requires the least 
effort. 
In summation, statistics from several Durham County elections 
have substantiated many of the propositions in the literaure about the 
effects of variations in ballot form. George B. Mather's :findings about 
the differences in voting machine ballots and paper ballots were tested 
and verified in the 1952 election. We found, as did Mather, that voters 
were more likely to vote on referendum questions when paper ballots 
were used. Additionally, there was some indication that the Durham 
County results concurred with Thomas' :findings that the use of voting 
machines could affect a referendum election outcome. Thomas feels 
that voting machines tend to screen out more negative votes than 
positive ones, and we, too, found some evidence that Constitutional 
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reforms passed by larger percentages when voting machines were used. 
Ballot positioning , also, was found to play a role in determining the 
rate of participation for particular races. Our study of a series of Con-
gressional and Senatorial contests showed us that races at the top of a 
ballot will receive more votes by virtue of their position on the ballot. 
When these races were positioned at the middle or end of the ballot, 
they received fewer votes than they did at the beginning. Hence, as 
the ballot gets longer, the roll-off increases as well. Finally, we found 
that when the Presidential race is placed on the same line as other 
races and when one is able to vote for all the contests by pulling one 
lever, roll-off decreases substantially. We can explain this in one of two 
ways: ( 1) favorable positioning of otherwise less visible races increases 
both the attention given to these races and thus the participation rate 
as well; or, ( 2) the ability to vote a straight ticket with minimal effort 
is an enticing alternative. Undeniably, the ballot form can be a very 
important determinant of election outcom es. 
Finally, however, we must return to our findings that ballot forms 
in Presidential and off-year elections serve to reinforce the behavioral 
differences in the respective electorates. What would seem an interesting 
line of inquiry for future research is to determine exactly how ballot 
form and individual motivation interact. To what extent can core voters 
withstand the fatiguing effects of complex ballots and less visible posi-
tioning? And how sensitive are peripheral voters to these same variations 
in ballot form? Walker found that the more educated and more in-
formed voters were more able to withstand the fatiguing complexities 
of ballot form, 21 and Campbell and Miller have demonstrated how moti-
vational factors can affect straight or split ticket voting. 22 What would 
be interesting to determine is exactly how institutional factors such as 
ballot form interac t witl1 systematic differences between the predomi-
nantly core-composed off-year electorate and th e less predominantly 
core-composed Presidential year electorate. 
21 Walker , op. cit., p. 460. 
22 Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight 
and Split Ticket Voting," American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), p. 311. 
